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I. Introduction 
Pyramid ownership structures are a common form of corporate ownership around 
the world. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (hereafter LLS) (1999) study the 20 
largest publicly traded firms in each of the 27 richest countries in the world and find that 
26% of the firms that have a large shareholder are controlled through a pyramid 
ownership structure. A pyramid ownership structure is defined as the chain of 
shareholding structure in which an ultimate owner is a major shareholder of some firms, 
which in turn own large portions of shares of other firms. LLS (1999) suggest that 
corporate ownership would be even more concentrated if one were to consider only 
ordinary size firms or firms in less developed countries. Claessens, Djankov, and Lang 
(2000) confirm that 38.7% of the largest publicly traded firms in East Asia are controlled 
by pyramid ownership.  
In this paper, I ask not only why an ultimate owner uses a pyramid ownership 
structure but also why this controlling mechanism had been sustained. The existing 
literature emphasizes that pyramid ownership structures expropriate minority 
shareholders. This occurs because the ultimate owner keeps control of the firms with 
smaller cash flow ownership, which discourages her from maximizing the profit of 
controlled firms and instead using these firms for her own private benefit. This separation 
between cash flow and the control rights reduces firm valuation through so-called 
“tunneling”
1. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (hereafter LLSV) (2002) 
study the largest and middle size public firms in the wealthiest 27 economies and find 
that firms in which the controlling shareholder holds the smaller cash flow rights have 
  2lower Tobin’s Qs by investigating. Claessens et al (2002) present similar evidence for 
nine East Asian economies.  
Although it is certainly true that the pyramid structure makes it less costly for the 
ultimate owner to steal cash flow, pyramid ownership structures may have another role. 
Firms that share an ultimate owner may also share internal capital, labor, and product 
sources in the same way as “business groups” do.  
A business group is one of the most typical users of pyramid ownership structure. 
Indeed, many researchers define “Business Groups” by their use of pyramid ownership 
structures.
2  This pyramid business group is prevalent in developing countries; “business 
groups dominate private sector activity in most emerging markets around the world.” 
(Khanna and Palepu (2000)) Traditionally, a pyramid business group was justified as a 
substitute for market mechanism. When capital markets or labor markets are ineffective, 
as the argument goes, internal markets inside a group but outside firms can alleviate the 
market failures and provide a mutual insurance mechanism.  
However, the recent literature doubts the validity of this claim. Pyramid business 
groups have been shown to destroy value in a number of ways, including over-
diversification (Mitton (2002), Claessens et al (1998), Rajan, et al (1999)), inefficient 
internal capital allocation (Scharfstein and Stein (2000), Scharfstein(1997)), and mergers 
(Bae et al (2002)). Betrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002) show evidence of tunneling 
in earning numbers, especially in non-operating profits, of pyramid group firms in India.  
                                                                                                                                                 
1 “‘Tunneling’ is defined as the transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the benefit of their controlling 
shareholders” (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (hereafter JLLS) (2000)). 
2 According to Khanna (2000), “Economists who have studied business groups have tended to emphasize 
that group affiliates are linked together through equity cross-ownership patterns.” Wolfenson (1999) 
explains, “‘group,’ typically has a complex ownership structures. Nevertheless, some highly stylized 
structures can be identified. A very common one is the pyramidal structure.”   
  3On the other hand, other researchers maintain that pyramid business groups still 
bring benefits. In a series of papers, Khanna and Rivkin (1999) and Khanna and Palepu 
(1999, 2000) have argued that business groups had been and continue to have a positive 
role in developing countries. They emphasize the lack of well-established institutions 
such as capital markets, legal structure and legal enforcement in developing countries and 
claim that business groups have served as substitutes.  
In this paper, I present a model explaining why groups of firms are prevalent and 
play a larger role in developing countries. I further explain why groups usually take the 
form of a pyramid ownership structure. The model suggests that the prime function of the 
group is enhanced by the pyramid ownership structure. Specifically, when a firm 
affiliated to a group faces financial distress, the ultimate owner of the group props up the 
troubled firm more willingly under a pyramid ownership structure. Since the pyramid 
causes a separation of ownership from control among the bottom firms, the controlling 
owner can divert cash flow from these firms to other companies higher in the chain 
without losing much cash flow for herself. In contrast with a simple vertical chain, the 
distinguishing feature of pyramid groups is that there are many firms at the bottom that 
can be expropriated. Furthermore, this pyramid effect is amplified in countries with 
ineffective outside investor protection, where the diversion of cash flow is less costly. 
Among group firms in the pyramid, the ultimate owner of a group of firms prefers to 
rescue the firms on the top layer in the pyramid than the bottom since the ultimate owner 
has the larger cash flow ownership in the top firms. 
I confirm these predictions by investigating 1,048 firms in eight East Asian 
countries in 1990s, which includes a period of a financial crisis during which an 
  4unexpected shock hit economies of the entire region. This period also includes time 
before and after the crisis, when negative shocks were idiosyncratic across firms. First, I 
find that the effect of group affiliation on market value to book ratio of financially 
distressed firms is largely positive in countries with ineffective investor protection but 
becomes weaker as investor protection improves. Second, however, the effect of group 
affiliation varies across firms, depending on their positions in the pyramid structure. I 
find that the separation of the cash flow ownership from control rights of the ultimate 
owner has a large negative effect on the value of financially distressed group firms. 
Furthermore, the group effect is positive for the firms whose cash flow rights are aligned 
with control rights but negative for firms where there is a significant separation of 
ownership from control. Finally, regarding interaction between firms within the same 
pyramid group, I find that positive shocks experienced by the bottom firms increase 
valuation of top firms in the same pyramid group whereas negative shocks occurred on 
the top firms decrease valuation of the bottom firms. This interaction effect indicates that 
top firms steal cash flow from the bottom firms with extra cash flow and that top firms 
get propped up in their distress by looting the bottom firms.    
These results explain why business groups are more prevalent and appear to have 
a larger influence, good or bad, in developing countries where investor protection is weak. 
While some researchers claim that the “institution” of business groups fills the gap 
created by a lack of a viable capital market and legal institutions (Khanna and Papelu 
(1999)), I show that this group mechanism is maintained at the expense of inefficient 
expropriation of outside shareholders. As my results suggest, firms in the top layer of the 
pyramid ownership group get the positive benefits of propping up while those of the 
  5bottom of the pyramid receive a negative group effect because of looting. The result as to 
the intermission effect of shocks within the same group dismisses the insurance 
hypothesis that a business group gives some insurance to fragile firms in the bottom of 
pyramid groups. In short, I find that groups have a positive effect on valuation only for 
top firms in the pyramid. Pyramid groups take advantage of a lack of legal institutions 
rather than serve as their substitutes. Additionally, I find that a separation of ownership 
from control does not matter much for the valuation of non-distressed firms before Asian 
Crisis. This might be the reason that the pyramid business group or crony capitalism was 
not severely criticized and the outsider had invested in the group bottom firms before 
Asian Crisis.  
In the next section, I illustrate in detail the ownership structures typically 
employed within family groups, focusing on the pyramid ownership structure. In Section 
III, I present a model indicating how the pyramid group works under financial distress 
and the effect of the level of investor protection on the function of the pyramid. In 
Section IV, I describe a database of firms in East Asia and evaluate the predictions of the 
model. Section V concludes.  
 
II. Pyramid Groups controlled by families  
Among the largest publicly traded firms in East Asia, pyramids are a common 
form of ownership structure. Claessens et al (2000) investigate 2,980 publicly traded 
firms in nine East Asian countries and find that 38.7% of them are controlled through a 
pyramid ownership structure. They also show that about half of these firms are ultimately 
controlled by families, with the exception of Japan (from the Philippines at the lowest 
  6with 44.6% under family control, to Indonesia at the highest with 71.5%). In this section, 
I illustrate how the ultimate owner forms a group under a pyramid ownership structure in 
three of the countries in my sample. I show how this affects the valuation of the firms in 
the pyramid.
3 
In figure 1, I show the Nursalim group in Indonesia (where the level of investor 
protection is the weakest among East Asian countries I study). This example illustrates a 
simple pyramid ownership structure. The Nursalim family owns 72% of cash flow rights 
of Gajah Tunggal Mulia and 50% of cash flow rights of Gajah Tunggal Sakti. In turn, 
Gajah Tunggal Mulia owns 55% of cash flow rights in Gadjah Tunggal, rubber and tire 
producing and distributing company. Gajah Tunggal Sakti owns a further 10% of these 
shares. Through these vertical ownership chains the Nursalim family controls Gadjah 
Tunggal with 45% (=72%*55%+50%*10%) of cash flow rights and 65% of control 
rights, as defined by the weakest link in the vertical chain. Gadjah Tunggal, in turn, owns 
50% cash flow rights in PT. BDNI Capital, a financial institution that owns 52% of cash 
flow rights in Bank Dagang Nasional, which is located at the bottom right in Figure 1. 
Through this vertical chain, the Nursalim Family has 50% of the control rights but only 
22% of cash flow rights in PT. BDNI Capital, located in the lower position in the 
pyramid. Similarly, they have 50% of the control rights and only 12% of cash flow rights 
in Bank Dangng Nasional, one of the bottom firms in the pyramid. Note that the large 
differences between ownership and control are more extreme at the bottom of the 
pyramid. This is typical of such vertical chain ownership. 
                                                 
3 I use Worldscope, Asian Company Handbook, Korean Company Yearbook, and Hong Kong Corporate 
Handbook to construct the following example figures of pyramid ownership structures. 
  7Comparing the market value to book ratios of these firms, it appears that the 
separation between cash flow and control rights has a large effect on firm valuation. In 
1995 and 1996, before the Asian Crisis, Gadjah Tunggal had a market value to book ratio 
close to the industry average of Indonesia (0.95 with an industry average of 0.91 in 1995, 
0.85 compared with an industry average of 0.86 in 1996).
4 Through the Crisis, its market 
value to book ratio improved against the industry average, i.e.1.17 (industry average of 
0.68) in 1997, 0.70 (industry average of 0.57) in 1998, and 3.02 (industry average of 
1.85) in 1999. On the other hand, PT. BDNI Capital, one layer below Gadjah Tunggal in 
the pyramid, suffered a loss in market valuation during the Crisis. While its market value 
to book ratio was 1.41 (industry average of 1.09) in 1995, and 1.78 (1.35 industry) in 
1996, it became 0.68 (0.57 industry) in 1997, 0.15 (0.20 industry) in 1998 and 0.15 (0.17 
industry) in 1999.  
Figure 2 shows the Hyundai Group, the largest business group, or Chaebol, in 
South Korea, a country where judicial efficiency is higher than in Indonesia while the 
Anti-Director Rights index is as bad as in Indonesia. Similar to the Nursalim group, the 
pyramid ownership structure creates a divergence between cash flow ownership and 
control, the worst for the bottom firms. Consider Hyundai Motor Service, motor vehicle 
sales company, at the bottom right of figure 2. The group founder’s family, the Chung 
family, directly owns 31% of cash flow rights in Hyundai Heavy Industry, which in turn 
owns 12% of cash flow rights in Hyundai Precision as well as 14% of cash flow rights in 
Hyundai Motor, the largest automobile manufacturer in South Korea. Hyundai Heavy 
Industry also controls several other publicly traded firms. Hyundai Precision owns 10% 
                                                 
4 The industry average is calculated as the average of market value to book ratio of firms in the same two 
digits SIC code in each country in my data set. 
  8of cash flow rights in Hyundai Motor Service. Through the vertical chain, the Chung 
family has only 0.3% of cash flow rights of Hyundai Motor Service, while maintaining 
10% control.  
We can see the effects of diversion between cash flow and control rights by 
examining relative performance of these firms before and after the Asian Crisis. Hyundai 
Motor service had higher market value to book ratio than the industry average of South 
Korea before the Crisis, i.e. 1.65 against an industry average of 1.24 in 1995 and 1.00 
compared with an industry average of 0.89 in 1996. During and after the Crisis, however, 
it fell below the industry average: 0.28 (0.48 industry) in 1997, 0.47 (0.63 industry) in 
1998, and 0.43 (0.75 industry) in 1999. On the other hand, Hyundai Motor, located above 
Hyundai Motor service in the pyramid, generally had higher market value to book ratio 
compared to the industry average throughout the Crisis. Its market value to book ratio 
was 0.72 (0.49 industry) in 1997, 0.51 (0.54 industry) in 1998, and 0.69 (0.51 industry) in 
1999 while it was generally below the industry average before the Crisis: 1.28 (1.25 
industry) in 1995 and 0.78 (0.91 industry) in 1996.
5 
 I note one additional intriguing fact: in both groups in Indonesia and in South 
Korea, financial institutions are placed at the bottom of the pyramid and generally have 
lower market value to book ratios. This might indicate that these groups intentionally 
keep their group financial institutions as tools to expropriate outsiders because there is 
more room to manipulate accounting numbers in financial institutions and to conduct 
tunneling through them.
6  
                                                 
5 It was 1.57 (2.39 industry) in 1993 and 1.57 (1.85 industry) in 1994. 
6 La Porta et al (2001) show evidence in the case of Mexican banks. Checking several other groups in 
Indonesia and South Korea, I find the similar pyramid pictures: financial institutions are placed at the 
bottom.  
  9  Indeed, there are plenty of evidence from the press that Hyundai group tried to 
prop up Hyundai Electronics through Hyundai Securities at the bottom in the pyramid. 
“[A]t least three Hyundai subsidiaries allegedly supplied a total of 223 billion won 
($186m) to Hyundai securities, an investment bank, to prop up the share price of the 
group’s electronics firm [Hyundai Electronics] last year,” and these “are part of a 
broader, more disturbing tale: that the big chaebol have been grabbing ever larger parts of 
the country’s financial-services industry in order to channel money – illegally – to loss-
making subsidiaries.” (Economist, 1999) 
The divergence between ownership and control has little effect in countries with 
high investor protection. In Figure 3, I examine the Li Ka-Shing Group in Hong Kong 
where investor protection level is the highest in Asia.
7 The Li Ka-Shing family directly 
owns 35% of cash flow rights in Cheung Kong, which in turn owns 34% of cash flow 
rights in Hutchison Whampoa, which in turn owns 44% of cash flow rights in China 
Strategic Investment located at the bottom (right) of the pyramid. China Strategic 
Investment suffers from the separation between ownership and control rights, i.e. the Li 
Ka-Shing family owns only 5% of cash flow rights but 34% of control rights.  
Nevertheless, China Strategic Investment generally had higher market value to 
book ratios than the industry average throughout the Crisis. Its market value to book ratio 
was 0.94 against the industry average of 0.68 in 1997, 0.26 (0.32 industry) in 1998, and 
0.59 (0.44 industry) in 1999. Before the Crisis, it was 0.94 (0.73 industry) in 1995 and 
0.86 (0.84 industry) in 1996. In short, China Strategic Investment maintained its market 
valuation through the Crisis in spite of the separation between ownership and control, 
                                                 
7 For figure 3, I use the data Claessens et al (2000) present in addition to the sources cited in footnote 3. 
  10which led to a loss of valuation of firms in the former two examples of Indonesia and 
South Korea.  
These three examples illustrate how the effect of pyramid structure on the 
valuation of firms varies across firms within a group and that the difference of this 
pyramid effect between countries might be related to the level of investor protection in 
each country. I formally examine this effect theoretically in the next section. More 
comprehensive empirical analysis confirms these illustrations in Section IV. 
                     
III. Model 
  In this section, I present a model in which firms have already been established and 
have already raised necessary capital to finance their investments. The model does not 
consider the ways how to raise capital but determines how and to what extent the ultimate 
owner decides to pay dividends, steal, or prop up firms in distress.  
  Suppose that there are a few firms that share an ultimate owner X. The ultimate 
owner is defined as the shareholder that controls the management decisions of all firms. 
There are two ways she can have γ control right of the firm N: (1) directly owning 
fraction γ of the voting shares of the firm N, or (2) using a “vertical” ownership chain. 
When X directly controls firm A, which in turn controls the firm B, X is assumed to have 
the control rights of firm B through a vertical chain as well as control of firm A by direct 
ownership. I follow LLS (1999) and Claessens et al (2000) and adopt the weakest link 
method as the definition of control rights. That is, when shareholder X owns fraction a of 
the voting shares of firm A which in turn owns fraction b of the voting shares of firm B, 
the ultimate owner X would have γ control rights of firm B where γ  = min[a, b] . In this 
  11section, it is assumed that the ultimate owner always has α control rights of each firm and 
that α is determined outside of the model. I assume that firms do not issue shares with 
different voting rights.
8 
  In this paper, I analyze ownership of firms under three different ownership 
structures: (1) Horizontal, (2) Vertical, and (3) Pyramid ownership structures. These are 
defined as follows: 
(1) Horizontal: the ultimate owner X controls both firm A and firm B by directly owning 
fraction α of the voting shares respectively.  
(2) Vertical: the ultimate owner X controls firm A by direct ownership and firm B 
through a “vertical” ownership chain. That is, X owns fraction α of shares of firm A, 
which in turn owns fraction α of shares of firm B. While X has α control rights and α 
cash flow rights of firm A, she only has α
2 of cash flow rights though keeping α of 
control rights of firm B.  
(3) Pyramid: the ultimate owner X controls firm A by direct ownership but controls firm 
B and firm C through a “vertical” ownership chain. She directly owns fraction α of the 
shares of firm A, which owns α of the shares of firm B and firm C. While X owns both 
the control rights and cash flow rights with α of firm A, she only owns α
2 cash flow right 
with α control rights of firm B and firm C.
9 
                                                 
8 Claessens et al (2000) reported that dual-class shares were rare in East Asian countries.  
9 It is fair to discuss that I should compare three ownership structures with the same number of firms, i.e. 
three firms for each structure. Comparison between the vertical structure with three layers and the pyramid 
structure with three firms can be interesting. Especially, I should do this comparison if I analyze which 
ownership structure the ultimate owner chooses to establish at the stage of starting up firm C. In Appendix 
A, I look at how the ultimate owner chooses and establishes the ownership structure with three firms and 
discuss why the ultimate owner does not usually use the long vertical chain but typically choose the 
pyramid structure. In developing countries, most group firms use the pyramid ownership structure while, on 
the other hand, non group firms usually use the short vertical chain or horizontal structure or they are imply 
independent firms. Since in the main text of this paper I do not analyze the stage that the ultimate owner 
chooses and establishes the whole ownership structure of the group but the stage that the ultimate owner 
  12  I next consider the allocation of revenues generated by firms, the central concern 
of the model. In period t=1, each firm i earns cash flow Ri (i = a, b, or c). This cash flow 
is distributed as a dividend on a pro rata basis to each shareholder unless the ultimate 
owner steals them. The ultimate owner can divert Si, a part of cash flow, from the firm i 
for her own purpose.  
  While such diversion is legal in most countries, it, however, incurs a cost of legal 
maneuvering, which depends on the quality of the law.
10  The cost is given by the 
diversion cost function, C(k, Si), which depends on the amount of diversion Si and the 
quality of  the minority shareholder protection, k. The better protected are the minority 
shareholders (the larger k), the more resources are wasted to expropriate a given share of 





) , ( kS S k C =   
Following other literature, I assume that these costs are borne by those who gain the cash 
flow benefit from diversion rather than by all the shareholders.
11 
This diversion can occur in two ways: either by stealing the revenues directly to 
increase the ultimate owner’s private cash flow or by transferring them from one firm to 
the other. While the existing literature does not consider the latter, the model in this paper 
emphasizes that both types of “tunneling” exist.    
Finally, I assume that each firm has a debt requiring a payment Pi at t=1 in order 
to continue its business. If the firm continues its business after t=1, the ultimate owner 
                                                                                                                                                 
decides how to use and distribute the cash flow the group firms earn, I focus the difference of cash flow 
distribution between the pyramid group and vertical or horizontal non-group firms.  
10 Burkhart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1998) is the first paper to model this relationship. JLLS (2000) gives 
several examples from Europe. LLSV (2002) make a simple model to capture this relationship following 
Burkhart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1998). 
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private benefit and the firm fails. Equity and debt structures are already established at 
t=0. For expositional simplicity, I assume that Pi=1/2 and Ri=1 unless a firm is not in 
distress. 
Under these assumptions, the ultimate owner maximizes the gains from the firms 
she controls. When she uses the Horizontal ownership structure, utility is given by: 
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Similarly, if the ultimate owner X uses the Vertical structure, she would 
maximize: 
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In the case of Pyramid, utility is given by: 
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These are the payoffs that the ultimate owner X gets if she chooses not to default 
and if revenues are enough to pay P. In this case, X chooses the level of stealing Si by 
maximizing these functions. The optimal level of stealing under each of ownership 
structure is given by: 
(5) 
* * * * 1
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11 This assumption does not affect my results. 
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* represents the ownership structure. It is 
easy to see that the levels of stealing from firm A are same for all three ownership 
structures (from (5)) while the level of stealing under Vertical or Pyramid structure is 
higher than under Horizontal structure for other firms (from (6)). This is because there is 
a separation between cash flow and control rights for firm B and firm C under Vertical or 
Pyramid structure.   
 Next, consider a case where one firm does not generate enough revenues to pay 
debts. If the ultimate owner X wants to keep this firm alive, then she has to prop it up. 
When X chooses propping up, she can inject cash from her own pocket, but she has a 
cheaper way: expropriating the minority shareholders of other healthy firms in which the 
ultimate owner has a small part of cash flow rights.  
Consider a case that firm A cannot make the debt payment, which leads to the 
possibility of propping up by transferring cash flow from other firms. Suppose that the 
revenue of firm A becomes smaller than the debt payment because of the shock, i.e. Ra 
=0< Pa=1/2. For expositional simplicity, I assume that Pa is too large for the ultimate 
owner to simultaneously steal and transfer from firm B or firm C to prop up firm A.
12 
Then, the transfer from firm i to firm j, denoted as Tij, is larger than S
* or S
** if the 
ultimate owner props up firm A. Under a given ownership structure, the ultimate owner X 
compares payoffs between propping up to save firm A and looting to let firm A die, and 
then decides whether to prop up firm A. Comparing the ultimate owner’s optimal 
decision under the Pyramid ownership structure with ones under other structures, it is 
found that the Pyramid structure has a positive effect on the distressed firm. 
                                                 
12 If an amount of transfer to prop up firm A were small enough for the ultimate owner to steal from firm B 
or firm C, then from Prediction 1 to Prediction 3 would be weakly established. 
  15Prediction 1 
  When a financially distressed firm is under Pyramid ownership structure, it would 
be more likely to be propped up than a financially distressed firm under Horizontal or 
Vertical ownership structure.  
Proof: See Appendix A. 
There are two factors that make propping up in Pyramid more attractive. One is 
the separation between cash flow and control rights of the ultimate owner. This 
mechanism is exactly the same as stealing in the Vertical or the Pyramid structure 
compared the Horizontal structure.  
The other factor is that more firms belongs to Pyramid ownership structure than 
in Vertical structure. If the ultimate owner controls more firms having separated 
ownership structures, it is cheaper to prop up troubled firms in her group. This is an 
intuitive but strong reason that almost all groups in developing countries form not simple 
vertical ownership chains but real “pyramid” structures. This is consistent with the 
common observation that group firms are too diversified in developing countries. 
Although this prediction is intuitive, it is less straightforward than it looks. This is 
because the ultimate owner has to give up stealing from firm B or firm C, which could be 
kept in her own pocket. This fact leads to an interesting implication that outside investors 
of the healthy firms would not be additionally expropriated much because propping up 
firm A would be partially financed by reduction of stealing from firm B and firm C.
13 
  Next, the effect of investor protection is considered in Pyramid structure.  
Prediction 2 
                                                 
13 This implication is consistent with the empirical results in the next section, in which it is found that the 
separation between a cash flow right and a control right has no effect on the financially healthy group firms.   
  16  A financially distressed firm in Pyramid structure is less likely to be propped up 
when there is better shareholder protection. 
Proof: See Appendix A.  
  Since propping up the distressed firms is financed through expropriation of the 
healthy firms, this cost increases as the outside shareholder protection improves. 
  Next, I investigate how the effect of separation between the cash flow and the 
control rights varies across pyramid group firms. Suppose that the same size of financial 
shock hit firm B instead of firm A in Pyramid structure, that is, Rb=0. Would the decision 
by the ultimate owner for a financially distressed firm be different? 
Prediction 3: 
  A firm with less separated ownership structure is more likely to be propped up 
than a firm with more severely separated ownership structure in Pyramid.  
Proof: See Appendix A. 
  This result comes from the fact that propping up occurs more cheaply when the 
ultimate owner controls more firms with separated ownership structure. While I do not 
formally model it, there is one additional factor to encourage propping up for the not 
separated firm. Although I assume private benefits from keeping distressed firms alive 
are the same across all firms, i.e. Va=Vb≡V, it may be the case that the ultimate owner’s 
future benefit from firm A is higher than from firm B. This is true because she has higher 
cash flow rights in firm A than in firm B. This factor gives another reason that the less 
separated firm would be propped up more favorably than the seriously separated firm.  
  Indeed, this private benefit factor strengthens two propositions above. Regarding 
Prediction 1, the ultimate owner would even more willingly prop up a distressed firm 
  17under Pyramid structure, considering the future benefit from a currently distressed firm. 
This is because she would more often face a chance to prop up if firms are shaped in 
Pyramid structure than in other structures. This higher chance comes from two facts: the 
ultimate owner has a larger number of firms and she can steal more. If she next faces 
financial distress in her other firms, she will be able to use the currently distressed firm to 
prop up others. Regarding shareholder protection in Prediction 2, the weak pyramid 
group effect to prop up in the good investor protection country would be even further 
weaker if the different levels of private benefits between countries is considered. This is 
because the future private benefit from keeping a firm alive is smaller in the better 
investor protection country. The ultimate owner would get less by stealing revenues from 
recovered firms in the future and, therefore, the private benefit in the future from 
controlling recovered firms is smaller.  
  Finally, the model also has an implication for interaction effect of pyramid group 
firms not only in financial distress but in all periods. 
Prediction 4: 
While a positive shock to bottom firms positively affects top firms in the same group, a 
positive shock to top firms does not affect bottom firms. 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
  This prediction combined with Prediction 3 is crucial to empirically distinguish 
the insurance hypothesis and the expropriation hypothesis for a pyramid group. Even if 
prediction 3 is empirically confirmed, it is still possible to claim that the pyramid group 
has a positive effect on bottom firms because they can gain some benefits from a group 
on average during non-distress period. For instance, even though bottom firms cannot 
  18gain any benefit in financial distress, they might share the risk and return with the other 
group firms. However, if prediction 4 is empirically confirmed, the insurance hypothesis 
for pyramid business groups can be dismissed. The bottom firm in the pyramid group 
cannot get help from the group in financial distress, when help is most needed and they 
are also expropriated through non-distress periods. I test these predictions in the next 
section. 
 
IV. Empirical Results  
In this section, I use a sample of firms in East Asia to examine the effects of 
group affiliation and the separation between cash flow and control rights on firm 
valuation. 
Data 
I use ownership data on firms constructed by Claessens et al (2000) covering 
2,980 publicly traded firms in nine East Asian countries: Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, 
Malaysia, South Korea, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. The data includes 
the largest firms in East Asia. Using the Worldscope database and additionally relying on 
other country specific sources, Claessens et al (2000) identify all large shareholders who 
owned more than 5% of outstanding shares of each firm at the end of the 1996 fiscal year  
Datastream is used to collect data on different classes of shares.  
Claessens et al (2000) identify the ultimate owners of all firms by tracing indirect 
ownership through the pyramid chain. They follow the method first described by LLS 
(1999): if a direct shareholder of a firm is not an individual owner but a separate legal 
entity (typically a publicly traded firm, a financial institution, or a foundation), then they 
  19trace the owners of these entities upwards until they reach the ultimate controller. In most 
cases, the ultimate controller is an individual or a family. Claessens et al (2000) do not 
further breakdown ownership within the family unit.
14   
This process generates data on both cash flow and control rights. The discrepancy 
between the two is generated either by multiple voting shares or by indirect ownership 
through the pyramid structure. 
I eliminate from the sample Japanese firms that form a disproportionably large 
share of total observations. The main reason is that Japanese groups are loosely 
connected through “Main-Banks” that are widely held public financial institutions and 
not controlled by families, therefore, their behaviors are quite different from family group 
firms in other East Asian countries.
1516  
I now turn to the dependent variable. I use market value to book ratio collected 
from Datastream to measure the valuation of the firms. This is defined to be the share 
price dividend by the net tangible assets per share for each financial year-end, adjusted 
for capital changes. To minimize the weight of outliers, I cap the two valuation measures 
at both the 1
st and 99
th percentiles for each year. If the negative numbers can still be 
found after this process, those firms with a negative market value to book ratio are 
eliminated.  
                                                 
14 They assume that every family owns and votes its shares collectively. 
15 One extra reason is that the Asian Crisis in 1997 directly had a much smaller effect on Japanese firms.  
16 Dropping Japanese firms, I have 1,740 firms with ownership data. Following existing literature, I exclude 
financial companies since their accounting data structure is different from those in other industries. This 
process deletes 420 companies and leaves 1,320 firms in the data set. The accounting data are from 
Worldscope which does not cover all 1,320 firms. The market valuation data are from Datastream whose 
coverage is smaller than Worldscope since Datastream does not cover companies whose shares have not 
been regularly traded. Therefore, in some sense, limiting coverage of market valuation variables makes the 
data less noisy. These two steps lead to around 1,000 observations (firms) for each year. 
  20I next turn to the determinants of firm valuation. Previous empirical works (LLSV 
(2002) and Claessens et al (2002)) and my model suggest that differences between cash 
flow and control rights have effects on firm valuation. I create a variable, “Non-
Separation,” defined as the ratio of cash flow rights to control rights of the ultimate 
owner of each firm. When the ultimate owner has no discrepancy between cash flow and 
control rights over the firm, non-separation variable takes the value one. As separation 
escalates, through the multiple layers in the pyramid chain, this number would be lower. 
Therefore, firms with the lower “Non-Separation” correspond to the “bottom” firms of 
Pyramid.     
Group affiliation comes from Claessens et al (2000). They use the country 
specific sources and identify whether each firm belongs to a family pyramid ownership 
group.  
Finally, I employ variables on the level of legal investor protection in each 
country, “Efficiency of the Judiciary System” and “Anti-Director Right, ” which are 
commonly used to describe the legal investment climate in each country.
17 The former 
index was originally produced by the country risk agency Business International 
Corporation. It takes values from 0 to 10, where lower scores imply lower efficiency 
levels. Among eight countries in my sample, Hong Kong and Singapore have the best 
score, 10.00, while Indonesia has the lowest, 2.50, followed by Thailand, 3.25, the 
Philippines, 4.75. “Anti-Director Rights” index was constructed by LLSV (1997, 1998). 
This index reflects two aspects of minority shareholders rights, the ease of voting for 
directors and the existence of a grievance mechanism for oppressed minority 
  21shareholders. The scale is from zero to six: among eight East Asian countries, Hong 
Kong scores the highest, five, while Indonesia and South Korea have the lowest score, 
two. These variables correspond to k in the model. 
I investigate firm valuation in 1990s, which includes both a period of the Asian 
Crisis during which an unexpected shock hit the whole economy and periods prior to and 
after the Crisis when a negative shock is idiosyncratic to each firm.
18   
I next sort each firm-year observation into two categories: financially distressed, 
or not financially distressed. A firm is defined to be in financial distress in a given year if 
its interest expense is larger than its operating income in each fiscal year.
19 When a firm 
faces financial distress, it typically requires cash flow injections to survive, sometimes 
from asset sales. However, in East Asia it is less common to receive cash from outside 
investors: most firms receive cash flow injections from firms in the same group. I model 
this in the last section and will test this effect below. 
 
Regression results 
The main concern of this paper is how the Pyramid ownership group works. Table 
II reports summary statistics for all firms, group firms and non-group firms. Group firms 
account for 43% of the total sample firms.  It appears that group firms are, on average, 
larger than non-group firms. Group firms have larger total assets (+20%), larger total 
                                                                                                                                                 
17 LLSV (1997, 1998) construct the Anti-Director Rights index and make the following literature adopt 
Efficiency of the Judiciary System as the legal investor protection index. Johnson et al (2000) is one of 
the most notable examples.   
18 There are two other reasons to use the data from 1995 to 1999 for year by year regressions: (1) many 
firms have not yet reported accounting number in 2000 fiscal year (when data was collected), (2) more than 
one-third of the firms in the data set have been listed in the last five years so that I would lose the 
substantial number of observations by going back to early 1990s. I expand the data period to 1992-2000 
when I test firm-year observations with firm fixed effects and year fixed effects.   
  22sales (+34%), and higher operating income (+32%) than non-group firms. On the other 
hand, they have the lower market valuation, i.e. lower market value to book ratio (-9%) 
and only 5% larger market capitalization although assets, sales, and income are much 
larger than non-group firms. Sales growth is also lower for group firms. As for the 
ownership structure, group firms have more serious separation problem (10% higher 
separation) while the cash flow ownership level is similar. However, the most 
conspicuous difference is as to debt. Debt to equity ratio is 1.21 for group firms (0.86 for 
non-group) and the interest expense for group firms is more than double of that for non-
group firms (+143% larger). Much larger standard deviation of financial need/sale
20 for 
group firms (0.84 versus 0.22) shows that, among group firms, many firms are in deep 
financial distress while others are rich in cash flow.  
In Table III, the group effect is tested for each year from 1995 to 1999, separately 
for financially distressed firms and not financially distressed ones. The model in Section 
III predicts that the group affiliation has a positive effect on valuation when firms are in 
financial distress. Prediction 1 shows that the Pyramid group firms would more likely get 
propped up when they face a financial difficulty than non-group firms without Pyramid 
structure. On the other hand, Prediction 2 indicates that this group effect is weaker in 
countries with better investor protection. 
The results in Table III confirm these predictions. The first column presents a 
result of a regression of market value to book ratio on group affiliation and judicial 
efficiency for distressed firms in 1995. It shows that group affiliation increases the 
market value to book ratio by 1.61 with 1% level significance. The negative number in 
                                                                                                                                                 
19 This is one of the most common definitions of financial distress. (Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein 
(1994) and Andrade and Kaplan (1998))  
  23the fourth row, -0.25, suggests that the interaction term between the group affiliation and 
judicial efficiency has a significantly negative effect on the market value to book ratio of 
distressed firms in 1995, which implies that the positive group effect mentioned above 
becomes weaker as the index of judicial efficiency increases. For instance, in Indonesia 
(with the lowest score of the judiciary efficiency 2.50), the total group effect on market 
value to book ratio in 1995 is 0.985 (=1.61-0.25*2.5). On the other hand, in Hong Kong 
(with the highest score of 10.00), the total group effect in 1995 is even negative, –0.89 
(=1.61-0.25*10). Interestingly, judicial efficiency itself has a positive effect on firm 
valuation: the number in the third row, 0.13, shows that improvement of judicial 
efficiency from Indonesia (2.5) to Hong Kong (10.0) increases the market value to book 
ratio by 0.975 (=0.13*(10.0-2.5)). As for non-distress firms, the result in the second 
column for 1995 shows that the three variables that are significant for distressed firms 
have not only insignificant but also negligible size effects on firm valuation.  
The results for non-crisis years, 1996 and 1999, are generally the same as those 
for 1995 explained in the last paragraph. For 1997 and 1998, when the Asian Crisis 
severely hit East Asia, these three variables show insignificant and small effects on firm 
valuation for both distressed and non-distressed firms
2122.  
These results suggest that the group effect of propping up exists in ordinary 
environment, i.e. in non-crisis years. However, this group effect disappears in countries 
                                                                                                                                                 
20 Financial need is defined as interest expense minus operating income. 
21 Exceptions are the negative effects of group affiliation for non-distressed firms in 1997 and for distressed 
ones in 1998. These facts are consistent with the interesting, although unproven, argument that the ultimate 
controller of the group firms believed that she could rescue all group firms then used cash flow of healthy 
group firms. However, in 1998, she recognized that it was not sustainable then she looted the distressed 
firms.   
22 I repeat the same test as in Table III, but with the Anti-Director Rights instead of Judicial Efficiency. The 
results in Table III are confirmed and show comparable effects for group affiliation and the interaction 
term. I also repeat the same test as in Table III with controlling the firm size. This does not affect the result.  
  24with good investor protection. On the other hand, the valuation of non-distressed firms 
did not considerably worsen in non-crisis years.
23  
Furthermore, these results appear to be consistent with the view that groups are a 
substitute for the institutions required to protect minority shareholders. While the total 
effect of judicial efficiency and group affiliation is (in 1995) 1.31 (=1.61+2.5*(0.13-
0.25)) for a group firm and 0.32 (=2.5*0.13) for a non-group firm in Indonesia, it is 0.41 
(=1.61+10.0*(0.13-0.25)) for a group firm and 1.30 (=10.0*0.13) for non-group firm in 
Hong Kong. Since Hong Kong has high investor protection, and Indonesia low, this 
suggests that the good investor protection stops looting of the financially distressed firm 
in Hong Kong while business group mechanism encourages the ultimate owner to prop 
up the distressed firm in Indonesia.
24 
Does the group effect, however, benefit all firms in the Pyramid groups, both 
bottom firms and top firms? Prediction 3 indicates that the bottom firms would not be 
propped up while the top firms would get cash flow transfers from other group firms, 
which implies that Non-Separation variable should have a positive effect on the valuation 
of distressed group firms. 
Table IV confirms this prediction by examining group firms alone. The first 
column corresponds to a regression for distressed group firms in 1995. The number of the 
third row indicates that the increase of non-separation variable from 0 (most separated) to 
                                                 
23 This is consistent with the model in the section III in which the cost of propping up comes from what 
would have been stolen unless rescue had occurred. However, it seems that the “deep pocket” of the 
ultimate owner was not enough to save group firms during Asian Crisis. The shock was too large to be 
financed by giving up stealing. 
24 For robust ness check, I divide eight countries into two groups, higher judicial efficiency score 
countries(top four countries: Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and Taiwan) and lower score countries, 
then repeat the same test as in Table III without the judicial efficiency and its interaction term with the 
group dummy but with the country dummies. For lower score countries, the coefficients of the group 
  251 (not separated at all) improves the market value to book ratio by 1.82. This means that a 
firm whose ratio of cash flow rights to control rights is the median among all group firms 
(non-separation variable = 0.68) has the lower market value to book ratio than a firm 
without separation (non-separation variable =1) by 0.58 (=1.82*(1-0.68)) in 1995. The 
effects of the Non-Separation variable are similar in other non-crisis years, 1996 and 
1999. In 1996 and 1999, the coefficients of Non-Separation variable are significant and 
positive, 0.92 in 1996 and 2.27 in 1999. For non-distressed firms, the Non-Separation 
variable has an insignificant effect in all years.
25 These results confirm that the effect of 
separation between cash flow and control rights on firm valuation become substantial 
under financial distress while separation does not affect firm valuation when there is no 
financial distress.
26 
I next ask a central question raised by Prediction 3: whether the bottom firms in 
the Pyramid group get the positive benefit from its group or they suffer from negative 
group effects under financial distress? The former case is still possible even though the 
propping up effect is much larger for the non-separated top firms. 
                                                                                                                                                 
dummy and the non-separation are positive in most years and often significant for distressed firms. On the 
other hand, for high score countries, those coefficients are not significant and sometimes negative.   
25 I repeat the same test as in Table IV, but with the Anti-Director Rights instead of Judicial Efficiency. The 
results in Table IV are confirmed and show a comparable separation effect. 
26 One intriguing fact in Table IV is that the separation effect is very weak for not distressed firms. There 
are at least a few possible interpretations. One is that in the growth economy, such as in East Asia, the 
ultimate owner does not want to steal but to invest cash flow in a profitable project that a firm plans if the 
firm is doing business well. It is more beneficial than stealing even for the ultimate owner as well as 
outside shareholders. Another explanation is that the accounting number of group firms is the number after 
looting. The separated ownership firm was not swamped in a distress by a real business shock but trapped 
into a financial trouble by the ultimate owner’s looting. The separated firm was “the ultimate owner’s pick” 
to be distressed. 
 However, the latter attractive story is not confirmed by data. Comparing the separation variables between 
the distress firms and the not distressed firms, I found little difference in the extent of separation between 
two groups. If the first story is applicable, then this can be the reason that outsiders invest in the group 
firms with the pyramid ownership structures in the low investor protection countries. If outside investors 
expect little risk of economic downturn in emerging market, whether rationally or not, then they do not care 
about the separation ownership structure. 
 
  26In Panel A of Table V, distressed firms are classified into more separated or less 
separated using the median non-separation value (0.68) and these two sets of firms are 
separately tested for each year. In Panel A, the coefficients of group affiliation for 
separated firms, in the second row of odd columns, are negative in all years except 1999 
and significant in the Crisis years, 1997 and 1998. On the other hand, less separated firms 
have a positive and significant group effect in all years except 1998. As for interaction 
term between group affiliation and judicial efficiency, its coefficients are positive for 
separated firms in all years except for 1999 while they are negative and significant for 
less separated firms in all years but 1998. These coefficients always have opposite signs 
of the coefficients of group affiliation.  
In Panel B of Table V, group firms are pooled into those with separation or those 
without. That is, the Non-Separation variable is less than equal to 1 for Separated Firms, 
on the other hand, it is equal to one for Not Separated Firms. While the coefficients of 
group affiliation are positive and significant for Not Separated firms in all years but 1998 
(the second row in even columns in Panel B), they are negative for Separated Firms in 
1996, 1997 and 1998. Comparing Panel B with Panel A of Table V, you can see that a 
positive group effect for Not Separated Firms in Panel B is generally larger than that for 
Less Separated Firms in Panel A. On the other hand, the group coefficient for Separated 
Firms is generally less negative than that for More Separated Firms in Panel A whose 
non-separation variables score below the median. This is consistent with the Prediction 3 
implying that a positive group effect gradually decreases and turns negative as the 
separation escalates. 
  27These results suggest that top firms in the Pyramid structure get propped up by 
other member firms in the group whereas the group firms in the bottom of the Pyramid 
get looted by the ultimate owner under financial distress. Moreover, these positive and 
negative group effects become weaker as the investor protection improves. Both facts, the 
opposite group effect for top firms versus one for bottom firms in pyramid and the 
positive and negative group effects exist only in low investor protection countries, 
support the prediction that these group effects are generated through expropriation of 
outside investors. 
 
Why did outside investors want to be expropriated? 
One interesting fact that can be related to Asian Crisis is recognized in Table V. 
The positive group effect for less separated firms is more strongly significant in non-
crisis years both in Panel A and Panel B while the negative group effect for more 
separated firms is significant only in Crisis years. This fact may shed light on a mystery 
as to a pyramid group: why did outside shareholders willingly invest in the firms that 
have a separated ownership structure in spite of expected possibility of expropriation? 
One possible answer is that outside investors, whether correctly or incorrectly, expected 
forever East Asian Miracle: the high growth economy in East Asia would continue 
forever. Then, it may not be irrational that the outside investors thought that the ultimate 
controlling family would not expropriate them much since there were numerous 
opportunities for the controlling family to invest cash flow in highly positive net present 
value projects rather than tunneling cash flow.  
  28The explanation above is also consistent with the results in Table III and Table 
IV: the group affiliation and non-separation do not matter for not distressed firms. Unless 
each firm suffers own idiosyncratic shock or an industry shock, the ultimate owner would 
not tunnel its cash flow since a good investment opportunity would give the ultimate 
owner higher cash flow (benefit) than tunneling.
27         
However, the expected forever East Asian Miracle was not realized and the Crisis 
hit the economy. Then, cash flow of group firms with separated ownership structure was 
tunneled and the market valuation of those firms dived and all investors and economists 
had suddenly started to criticize the pyramid business group after the Crisis. 
 
Tracing a transmission effect within a group 
In order to trace propping up or looting within a pyramid group and to test 
Prediction 4 in the last section, I use another approach to test the effects on firm 
valuations among group firms in Table VI through XI. In Table VI, the market value to 
book ratio of a firm is regressed on the industry average of the market value to book ratio 
in a given country with the year fixed effect and the firm fixed effect.
28 This approach 
follows the regression strategy of Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002). They 
interpret the industry average variable in a given year as a firm specific shock that each 
firm cannot control.
29 As the firm fixed effect is added, the level of the market to book 
                                                 
27 Friedman and Johnson (2000) model this point. Please see also footnote 26.  
28 Industry controlling groups are defined at the two-digit SIC code level whenever there are at least three 
firms (excluding sample firms) in a given country in the data set. If they are less than three, I use twelve 
broad industry categories defined by Campbell (1996). 
29 While Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002) use accounting data (earnings) as a dependent variable, 
I use the market valuation. They use the accounting number and not the market valuation data for two 
reasons. One reason is that they intend to directly capture cash transfer to show the existence of tunneling. 
The other is that their stock price data for India is very noisy because they cover relatively small public 
firms. I use the market valuation data instead of the accounting data for three reasons. First, my data set 
  29ratio should be considered as a shock. Since this paper focuses on the financial distress 
effect, which varies depending on the group affiliation or the position within the pyramid 
group, I add two independent variables: the financial distress dummy and the interaction 
term between group affiliation and the financial distress dummy. Then, bottom firms and 
top firms are tested separately. Group firms are classified into the bottom or the top firms 
according to the relative size of non-separation variable within a given group. Firms with 
large number of non-separation variable (close to one) are categorized to top firms. For 
non-group firms, this ranking is defined by the relative size of non-separation level within 
a given country. If the bottom firms in the pyramid group get looted more than non-group 
firms during financial distress, the coefficient of the interaction term between group 
affiliation and financial distress should show a negative sign.  
In Table VI, the coefficients of the interaction term between group affiliation and 
the financial distress are significant and negative for bottom firms (the third row in odd 
columns) while they are positive for top firms (the third row in even columns). Even after 
controlled for the firm fixed effect, the industry shock and the economic environment in a 
given year, financial distress additionally decreases the market value to book ratio by 
0.21 for the bottom half group firms (third row in the third column) but additionally 
increases by 0.10 for the top half firms compared with non-group firms (third row in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
covers relatively large public firms in eight East Asian countries for which Datastream gives the reliable 
market price data. Second, in East Asia, it is said that the pyramid business group props up or loots group 
firms by indirect mechanism and not by cash transfers or transfer pricing. One of the most typical methods 
is loan guarantee. Therefore, the market valuation data captures the indirect and whole effect of within-
group transmission. Finally, since the stock price shows the valuation for outside shareholders and the 
accounting number itself is not directly related to the payoff for outside shareholders, it is preferable to use 
the valuation data to measure the group effect on the outside shareholders, whether expropriation or 
propping up.   †  
  30fourth column).
30 This firm specific financial distress effect is not negative or significant 
for non-group firms whose ownership is separated from control. In Table VII, I restrict 
my samples to group firms and repeat the test in Table VI. I confirm my prior results. 
While the coefficients of financial distress dummy are negative for bottom firms in all 
four specifications (the second row in odd columns), they are positive or zero for top 
firms (the second row in even columns). In Table VIII, group firms are classified to 
bottom firms or top firms not according to non-separation but according to cash flow 
ownership within a group. Although the significance level is weaker, the result is 
consistent with those of Table VI and Table VII: financial distress dummy shows the 
negative coefficient for bottom group firms but positive for top group firms.
31  
While the results of these three tables confirm the former results up to Table V, 
the current regression strategy different from the one up to Table V makes it possible to 
test two opposite hypotheses: tunneling versus insurance. As mentioned in the paragraph 
related to Prediction 4 in the last section, the tunneling hypothesis is that the bottom firms 
in the pyramid group are expropriated through tunneling and do not gain any benefit from 
the group. On the other hand, the insurance hypothesis is that the bottom firms get some 
benefits under difficult circumstances and they pay some fees for this insurance when 
they have less difficulty. The results through Table III to Table VIII suggest that the 
bottom group firms lose their market valuations in their financial distress although the top 
firms in the pyramid are protected from losing their market valuations. That is, if the 
insurance hypothesis is applied, it appears that the bottom firms pay insurance fee when 
                                                 
30 These numbers are compared with non-group firms. The total effect of financial distress on group firms 
is –0.11 (=-0.21+0.10) for bottom one-half firms and 0.05 (=0.10+(-0.05)) for top one-half firms. 
  31they most need the group insurance in distress so as to gain some kind of group benefit 
that I can not have identified so far. However, it is not impossible to argue, for instance, 
that the ultimate controlling family selectively decides to rescue a distressed firm on the 
top of the pyramid because the whole group cannot survive without the core firm. In the 
face of a crisis for the whole group, the bottom firms would be looted, but, in the case of 
mild distress for a single firm (for instance, a negative industry shock), the bottom firms 
would get insurance. Then, I have to more specifically identify the transmission 
mechanism of the valuation of firms within a group for the whole period not only during 
financial distress. 
In Table IX, I classify an industry shock into a positive or a negative shock. Using 
the first difference specification, a change of market value to book ratio of a firm is 
regressed on a positive or a negative change of an industry average within a given 
country of market value to book ratio. This is regarded as an own shock of a given firm. 
Moreover, I add as the independent variables the shocks occurred to other firms in the 
same group in order to investigate the effects of group shocks on each firm. I classify 
these group shocks into four categories: the weighted average of positive [negative] 
shocks occurred to bottom [top] firms.
32 The weight for each firm is calculated as the 
ratio of its total asset to the sum of the total assets of all group firms in a given group. If 
the ultimate owner steals from the bottom firms on behalf of the top firms, then the 
coefficient of positive shock of the bottom firms should be positive for the top firms but 
                                                                                                                                                 
31 Regressions in Table VI, Table VII and Table VIII are repeated with a different dependent variable: row 
stock return instead of the market to book ratio for robustness check. The results are weaker but similar to 
the results through Table VI to Table VIII.  
32 Bertrand and et al (2002) also investigate an effect of group shock on each firm, they do not distinguish 
between a positive and a negative group shocks. By classifying group shocks into positive and negative, I 
can identify a transmission effect within a group as I investigate below.   
  32not for the bottom firms. Furthermore, if the top firms get propped up in their distress by 
looting the bottom firms, I should find a positive coefficient of negative shock of top 
firms for the bottom firms but not for top firms.
33  
In even columns of Table IX (for top firms), the coefficients for a positive shock 
of the group bottom firms are significant and positive. This means that the group top 
firms would increase their market valuations when the bottom firms in the same pyramid 
business group receive their own positive shock. On the other hand, the coefficients for a 
positive shock of the group bottom firms are insignificant for bottom firms (in odd 
columns). That is, a positive shock to the bottom firms only benefits the top firms, but not 
the bottom firms. Then, how about a negative shock of the top firms? In odd columns (for 
bottom firms), a negative shock of top firms shows a positive coefficient and it is 
significant in two cases out of the three. On the other hand, it is not significant at all with 
zero or even a negative sign for the top firms (in even columns).  These facts suggest that 
a negative shock occurred to a top firm is transmitted to the valuation of the bottom firms 
but not to other top firms in the same group.   
The result of Table IX supports the tunneling hypothesis against the group 
insurance hypothesis. The bottom firms in the pyramid group get looted to prop up the 
top firms in the same group when the top firms receive a negative shock and the top firms 
steal from the bottom firms when the bottom firms have a positive shock.   
 One possible counter-argument is that the top firms are so influential and the 
bottom firms so fragile that the bottom firms would be affected by group shocks. The 
result in Table IX does not support this argument. The positive shocks of top firms have 
                                                 
33 Since a negative shock takes a negative value (not absolute value), if a distressed top firm negatively 
affects a bottom firm within a group, then a coefficient for an negative shocks of top firms would be 
  33no effect on the bottom firms although the negative shocks of the top firms significantly 
affect the bottom firms. The influential top firms asymmetrically affect the bottom firms. 
Also, the bottom firms asymmetrically affect the top firms. Positive shocks of the bottom 
firms affect the top firms although the negative ones do not.  
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, I show that group affiliation has a positive effect on valuation of 
firms when a firm is in financial distress although this only holds true in low quality 
investor protection countries and not in those with the good investor protection. Propping 
up by a group would benefit the controlling owner as well as outside investors in the top 
firms which, although, is achieved by expropriating outside investors in the bottom firms. 
This group effect is larger in a country with the lower investor protection because the 
transfer from the bottom firms can be made at a lower cost and because the private 
benefit to keep member firms alive is larger in bad investor protection countries. This 
argument explains why groups are more prevalent in developing countries. Although the 
group looks like a substitute for legal investor protection, this role is played under higher 
inefficient expropriation cost and it is incompatible with development of legal outside 
investor protection. More importantly, evidence shows that a firm belonging to a pyramid 
group gets propped up only if it is one of top firms in a pyramid. A bottom firm in a 
pyramid group gets looted under financial distress because its ownership structure entails 
the separation between cash flow and control rights. In short, I find that groups have a 
positive effect on valuation only for top firms in the pyramid. Pyramid groups exploit a 
lack of legal institutions rather than serve as substitutes for them. 
                                                                                                                                                 
positive. 
  34Additionally, the evidence in Section IV shows that the group firms do not suffer 
from lower valuation by market because of the separation between cash flow and the 
control rights unless they are in financial distress. This might be a reason why outsiders 
invest in the group firms with the pyramid ownership structures in the low investor 
protection countries. If outside investors expect little risk of economic downturn in 





If the ultimate owner props up firm A, her payoff for each ownership structure is 
as follows, 
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where Tij is the transfer from firm i to firm j. 
 On the other hand, if the ultimate owner X decides to let firm A die, she gets 
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  35Under each ownership structure, the ultimate owner X compares payoffs between 
propping up to save firm A and looting to let firm A die. She props up firm A if 
(14)    (i = H,V,P)  0 ) , ( ) , ( > − LA i U PA i U
This condition for each ownership structure can be written, 
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Comparing the Pyramid ownership structure with other structures, it is found that 
the Pyramid structure has a positive effect on the distressed firm. 
 
Proof of Prediction 1 
First, Pyramid is compared with Vertical structure. Taking a difference between the 
left hand sides of (16) and (15),  
2 2 2 * * 2 * * 2 * *
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As the ultimate owner wants to minimize transfers into firm A,  
(17)   ( δ>0)  δ + ≡ = = +
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Last equality comes from the assumption that propping needs more than the stolen cash 
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  36Therefore, the financially distressed firm in Pyramid structure is more likely propped up 
than in Vertical structure.  
 Similarly,  comparing  Pyramid with Horizontal structure, it is found by taking a 
difference between that the left hand sides of (16) and (14), 
(18)  )) (
2
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Since S
**>S
* from (6), (18)>0.  The distressed firm in Pyramid structure is more 




Proof of Prediction 2 
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From (17), (19)<0. The ultimate owner would less likely choose to prop up rather than let 
troubled firms die as the shareholder protection improves.▪ 
 
Proof of Prediction 3 
When firm A is financially distressed, the ultimate owner X would consider the 
equation (16) to decide whether she props up firm A or not. Similarly, when firm B is 
financially distressed, she would consider the following condition: 
(20)  0 ) ( ) (
2
1
) ( ) (
2
1 * * 2 * * 2 * * 2 * * 2 * > − − − − − − − − − − S T S S T k S T S S T k V ba cb ab ab b α α    
  37  Comparing the left hand sides of (16) and (20), 
(21) 
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To minimize the diversion costs, when firm A is propped up, the transfer from firm B 
should be same amount as from firm C, that is, Tba=Tca≡ t=Pa/2. Also, when firm is 
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Assume that Va=Vb. Then, (22) becomes 
(24)  δ α α
α α









From (19), δ>0, then (24)>0. Therefore, the ultimate owner would more willingly prop 
up firm A, not separated ownership structure firm, than firm B with separated ownership 
structure.▪  
  38Proof of Prediction 4 
Until now, I assume that both transfer and stealing do not simultaneously occur 
since a large amount of transfer is needed to prop up in financial distress.  As for 
Prediction 4, I now have to think that both transfer and stealing simultaneously occur 
because a positive shock gives a plenty of cash flow to transfer and steal.  
Suppose that transfer entails a lower cost than stealing since stealing cash flow 
into the pocket of the ultimate owner more directly violates the laws than transferring 
cash flow of one public firm into other public firms in the same group in most countries. 
Then, the utility function for the ultimate owner is as follows:  
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where 0<λ<1. In the case of positive shock occurs to Firm B (bottom firm), i.e. if cash 
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For simplicity, I only focus on the transfer from the firm with a positive shock (here, 
Firm B) and ignore the transfer from firms without positive shocks (Firm A and Firm C). 
There is no merit to transfer cash flow from one bottom firm into other bottom firms with 
transferring cost. However, there is an incentive to transfer form the bottom firm to the 
top firm, i.e. from Firm B to Firm A, because transferring entails lower cost than stealing 
  39directly into own pocket in spite of getting only partial amount of cash flow transferred 
(α<1).  
  In the cash of positive shock occurred to the top firm, Firm A, on the other hand, 
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There is no merit to transfer cash flow from the top firm into the bottom firms with 
transferring cost even though the transferring cost is cheaper than stealing. Therefore, a 
positive shock occurred in bottom firms positively affects top firms in the same group 
through transferring (T ), a positive shock of top firms does not affect bottom firms 
(T ). ▪ 
0 > ba
0 = = ac ab T
 
Appendix B 
Suppose that the ultimate owner X has already established the firm A and the firm 
B by the Vertical ownership structure: X directly owns α cash flow right of the firm A, 
which in turn owns α cash flow right of the firm B, then X controls the firm B with 
owning α
2 cash flow right through vertical chain. Now X wants to establish a new firm, 
firm C, and X has three choices: Horizontal (X directly owns α cash flow right of firm C), 
Pyramid (firm A owns α cash flow right of firm C as well a α cash flow right of firm C s 
one of firm B), and Vertical (firm B whose α cash flow right is owned by firm A in turn 
owns α cash flow right of firm C). I analyze here only the simplest case that α is fixed, 
that is, the initial owner of firm C would sell the fixed amount of shares to outside 
  40shareholders, 1-α. The initial owner would get the cash flow the outside investors pay for 
1-α shares of firm C. However, he should also pay a starting up cost I that is required to 
set up firm C. That is, X in the horizontal case, firm A in the pyramid case, and firm B in 
the vertical case, they would pay the starting up cost and get the cash flow paid by 
outside investors. This assumption follows Wolfenzon (1999).   
For expositional simplicity, I assume that the firm C exists for only one period. 
Using the same notation in section 3, the ultimate owner X will get 
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if he chooses H(horizontal), P(pyramid), or V(vertical) respectively. In each equation, the 
first two terms represent the cash flow that the ultimate owner X would get through 
stealing after establishment of firm C and the last term shows a upfront payment that the 
outside investors pay upfront for 1-α shares of firm C. The ultimate owner X would get 
this upfront payment directly (horizontal case) or through his ownership of the cash flow 
right of firm A (pyramid case) or firm B (vertical case). 
To compare the payoffs for X under three ownership structures, I take the 
differences between (B1), (B2), and (B3): 
0 }
2
) 2 )( 1 (
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Pyramid ownership structure will be chosen if (B4) and (B5) are satisfied. It is easily 
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      ( B 6 )  
For instance, if I=0.8 (20% investment return), when α=0.25, (B6) will be 0.89<k<3.55; 
when α=0.5, (B6) will be 1.09<k<2.19. If k is smaller (larger) than this range, the vertical 
(horizontal) ownership will be chosen. This simple calculation is informative. Although it 
is very difficult to interpret the absolute level of k as the index of investor protection level, 
k can be regarded as the relative size to profit level (normalized one) and other variables. 
From the analysis in section 3 and this Appendix B, you can see that the ultimate owner 
would steal all of cash flow in firms under a wide range of α if k were smaller than one 
(S
** would be larger than one, for instance, if α<0.45 when k=0.8). Therefore, if you 
think that the model in this paper as well as ones in other literature is applicable to 
capture the relationship between tunneling and investor protection in the real world, then 
k should be larger than one even in developing countries. If k is larger than one, for 
ordinary α (roughly speaking less than 0.5), the ultimate owner should use the pyramid 
structure (when k is small) or the horizontal structure (when k is large) but he would not 
want to use the vertical structure for firm C. This argument is consistent with the fact that 
the business group does not usually use the long vertical chain in real world.     
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Claessens et al (2000). Equal to the fraction of the firm’s voting rights 
owned by its controlling shareholder.  To measure control rights, they 
combine a shareholder’s direct (i.e. through shares registered in her name) 
and indirect (i.e. through shares held by entities that, in turn, she control) 
voting rights in the firm. A shareholder has an x% indirect control of the 
firm A if (1) she controls directly the firm B which, in turn, directly control 
x% of the votes in the firm A, or (2) she controls directly the firm C which 
in turn controls the firm B which, in turn, directly controls x% of the votes 
in the firm A.   
    
Cash Flow Rights  Claessens et al (2000). Ultimate cash flow right of the controlling 
shareholder in the sample firm. Cash flow rights are computed as the 
product of all the equity stakes along the control chain. 
 
Non-Separation  The ratio of the Cash flow rights to the control rights. 
 
Efficiency of Judiciary 
system 
By the country-risk rating agency Business International Corporation. This 
is the assessment of the “efficiency and integrity of the legal environment 
as it affects business, particularly foreign firms.” It “may be taken to 
represent investors’ assessments of conditions in the country in question.” 
Average between 1980-1983. LLSV(1998). 
 
Anti-Director Rights   LLSV(1998). This index is formed by adding one when: (1) the country 
allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote; (2) shareholders are not 
required to deposit their shares prior to the General Shareholder meeting; 
(3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities on the 
board of directors is allowed; (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in 
place; (5) the minimum percentage of shre capital that entitles a shareholder 
to call for an Extraordinary Shareholers’ Meeting is less than or equal to ten 
percent; (6) or when shareholders have preemptive rights that can only be 
waved by a shareholders meeting.  
Non-Separation* 
judicial efficiency  
 




Equal to the product of Non-separation and anti-Director Rights. 
Group  Equal to 1 if a firm is belong to a family business group in each country, 
otherwise 0. Claessens et al (2000). 
 
Market Value to Book 
Ratio 
This is the share price dividend by the net tangible assets per share for each 











Financial Distress  
 
A firm is defined to be in financial distress in a given year if its interest 
expense is larger than its operating income in each fiscal year. Interest 
expense and operating income from Worldscope.  
    




Ranking within a given group in respect of the relative size of non-
separation variable. Firms with large number of non-separation variable 
(close to one) are categorized to top firms. For non-group firms, this 
ranking is defined by the relative size of non-separation level within a 
given country.  
 
Ranking of cash flow  Ranking within a given group in respect of the relative size of non-
separation variable. Firms with large number of cash flow ownership are 
categorized to top firms.   
 
Industry shock  An industry average of the market value to book ratio within a country in 
each year. Industry controlling groups are defined at the two-digit SIC code 
level whenever there are at least three firms (excluding sample firms) in a 
given country in the data set. If they are less than three, I use twelve broad 
industry categories defined by Campbell (1996). 
 
Group shock  A weighted average (by sales) of an industry shock for each firm within a 
given group. An own shock, an industry shock for a given firm is excluded. 
This group shock is classified into four categories: positive [negative] 
shock of bottom [top] firms.   
 
  49  50
 













































































































1. Data source: Worldscope, Claessens et al (2000). All data represent in the end of 1996 fiscal year. All 
monetary variables are expressed in thousand US dollar. 
2. Standard deviations are in prentheses. 
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i
r
m
s
 
d
o
 
n
o
t
 
h
a
v
e
 
i
t
:
 
i
.
e
.
 
n
o
n
-
s
e
p
a
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
e
q
u
a
l
 
o
n
e
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
m
.
 
T
h
e
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
c
a
l
e
n
d
a
r
 
y
e
a
r
 
e
n
d
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
s
 
o
f
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
t
o
 
b
o
o
k
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
c
h
 
c
o
m
p
a
n
y
.
 
T
h
e
 
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
(
1
)
 
E
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
c
y
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
:
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
o
f
 
E
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
c
y
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
i
n
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
m
 
i
s
 
i
n
c
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
e
d
,
 
(
2
)
 
G
r
o
u
p
:
 
e
q
u
a
l
 
t
o
 
1
 
i
f
 
a
 
f
i
r
m
 
b
e
l
o
n
g
s
 
t
o
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
a
l
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
i
n
 
e
a
c
h
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
,
 
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
 
0
.
 
S
a
l
e
s
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
,
 
a
n
d
 
D
e
b
t
 
t
o
 
e
q
u
i
t
y
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
a
r
e
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
l
e
d
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
.
 
P
-
v
a
l
u
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
s
h
o
w
n
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
 
a
=
S
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
1
%
 
l
e
v
e
l
;
 
b
=
S
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
5
%
 
l
e
v
e
l
;
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=
S
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
1
0
%
 
l
e
v
e
l
.
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S
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a
r
a
t
e
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a
n
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N
o
n
-
S
e
p
a
r
a
t
e
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f
i
r
m
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F
i
r
m
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
t
o
 
b
o
o
k
 
f
o
r
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
1
9
9
2
 
t
o
 
2
0
0
0
 
o
n
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
s
h
o
c
k
,
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
l
y
 
d
i
s
t
r
e
s
s
e
d
 
d
u
m
m
y
,
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
t
e
r
m
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
l
y
 
d
i
s
t
r
e
s
s
e
d
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
a
n
d
 
s
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
.
 
R
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
a
r
e
 
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
e
d
 
s
e
p
a
r
a
t
e
l
y
 
f
o
r
 
h
i
g
h
l
y
 
s
e
p
a
r
a
t
e
d
 
a
n
d
 
l
e
s
s
 
s
e
p
a
r
a
t
e
d
 
f
i
r
m
s
.
 
F
i
r
m
s
 
a
r
e
 
d
i
v
i
d
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
r
a
n
k
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
n
o
n
-
s
e
p
a
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
w
i
t
h
i
n
 
a
 
f
a
m
i
l
y
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
(
f
o
r
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
f
i
r
m
s
)
 
o
r
 
w
i
t
h
i
n
 
a
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
(
f
o
r
 
n
o
n
-
g
r
o
u
p
 
f
i
r
m
s
)
 
i
n
t
o
 
b
o
t
t
o
m
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
o
r
 
t
o
p
 
o
n
e
s
.
 
A
 
t
o
p
 
f
i
r
m
 
h
a
s
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
r
g
e
s
t
 
n
o
n
-
s
e
p
a
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
w
i
t
h
i
n
 
e
a
c
h
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
o
r
 
e
a
c
h
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
.
 
T
h
e
 
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
(
1
)
 
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
s
h
o
c
k
:
 
a
n
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
t
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b
o
o
k
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
w
i
t
h
i
n
 
a
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
i
n
 
e
a
c
h
 
y
e
a
r
,
 
(
2
)
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
d
i
s
t
r
e
s
s
 
d
u
m
m
y
:
 
e
q
u
a
l
 
t
o
 
1
 
i
f
 
a
 
f
i
r
m
’
s
 
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
 
e
x
p
e
n
s
e
 
i
s
 
l
a
r
g
e
r
 
t
h
a
n
 
i
t
s
 
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
n
g
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
i
n
 
e
a
c
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f
i
s
c
a
l
 
y
e
a
r
,
 
(
3
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t
h
e
 
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
G
r
o
u
p
 
a
n
d
 
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
d
i
s
t
r
e
s
s
 
d
u
m
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.
 
Y
e
a
r
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
r
m
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
a
r
e
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
.
 
P
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v
a
l
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h
o
w
n
 
i
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p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
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i
g
n
i
f
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n
t
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t
 
1
%
 
l
e
v
e
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=
S
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
5
%
 
l
e
v
e
l
;
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=
S
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
1
0
%
 
l
e
v
e
l
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m
 
f
i
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d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
r
e
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r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
t
o
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o
o
k
 
f
o
r
 
y
e
a
r
s
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r
o
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1
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9
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o
 
2
0
0
0
 
o
n
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
s
h
o
c
k
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f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
l
y
 
d
i
s
t
r
e
s
s
e
d
 
d
u
m
m
y
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a
n
d
 
s
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
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.
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e
g
r
e
s
s
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o
n
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r
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p
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r
m
e
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e
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r
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t
e
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r
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i
g
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e
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a
r
a
t
e
d
 
a
n
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e
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t
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r
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r
o
u
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f
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r
m
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r
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d
i
v
i
d
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
r
a
n
k
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
n
o
n
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s
e
p
a
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
w
i
t
h
i
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f
a
m
i
l
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r
o
u
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.
 
A
 
t
o
p
 
f
i
r
m
 
h
a
s
 
t
h
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l
a
r
g
e
s
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n
o
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e
p
a
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
d
e
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w
i
t
h
i
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a
c
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r
o
u
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T
h
e
 
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
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r
e
 
(
1
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I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
s
h
o
c
k
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n
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
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a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
o
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t
h
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m
a
r
k
e
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v
a
l
u
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o
o
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r
a
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w
i
t
h
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c
o
u
n
t
r
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e
a
c
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y
e
a
r
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2
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f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
d
i
s
t
r
e
s
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d
u
m
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q
u
a
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t
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i
f
 
a
 
f
i
r
m
’
s
 
i
n
t
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r
e
s
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x
p
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n
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g
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p
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.
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e
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f
i
x
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f
f
e
c
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a
n
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f
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r
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f
i
x
e
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e
f
f
e
c
t
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r
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i
n
c
l
u
d
e
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a
l
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e
s
 
a
r
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h
o
w
n
 
i
n
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a
r
e
n
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h
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s
e
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.
 
a
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S
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
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t
 
1
%
 
l
e
v
e
l
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b
=
S
i
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n
i
f
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c
a
n
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5
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v
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l
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c
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f
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c
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n
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1
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c
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m
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r
k
e
t
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a
l
u
e
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o
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o
o
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o
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r
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r
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2
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i
n
d
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r
y
 
s
h
o
c
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f
i
n
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n
c
i
a
l
l
y
 
d
i
s
t
r
e
s
s
e
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d
u
m
m
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a
n
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s
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
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v
a
r
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a
b
l
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.
 
R
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
a
r
e
 
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
e
d
 
s
e
p
a
r
a
t
e
l
y
 
f
o
r
 
f
i
r
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s
 
w
i
t
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h
i
g
h
l
y
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e
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r
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t
e
d
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n
d
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p
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r
a
t
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r
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e
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d
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n
k
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n
g
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c
a
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n
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r
s
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m
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t
o
p
 
f
i
r
m
 
h
a
s
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
r
g
e
s
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c
a
s
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f
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h
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a
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h
e
 
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
(
1
)
 
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
s
h
o
c
k
:
 
a
n
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
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f
 
t
h
e
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a
r
k
e
t
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a
l
u
e
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o
o
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i
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i
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c
o
u
n
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r
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i
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e
a
c
h
 
y
e
a
r
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2
)
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
d
i
s
t
r
e
s
s
 
d
u
m
m
y
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q
u
a
l
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1
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f
 
a
 
f
i
r
m
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i
n
t
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r
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x
p
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p
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1
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e
v
e
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n
i
f
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c
a
n
t
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5
%
 
l
e
v
e
l
;
 
c
=
S
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
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t
 
1
0
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l
e
v
e
l
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r
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u
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E
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
B
o
t
t
o
m
 
a
n
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t
h
e
 
T
o
p
 
f
i
r
m
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F
i
r
s
t
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
t
o
 
b
o
o
k
 
f
o
r
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
1
9
9
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t
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2
0
0
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i
s
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
o
w
n
 
a
n
d
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
s
h
o
c
k
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a
n
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s
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
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.
 
R
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
a
r
e
 
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
e
d
 
s
e
p
a
r
a
t
e
l
y
 
f
o
r
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
b
o
t
t
o
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a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
t
o
p
 
f
i
r
m
s
.
 
F
i
r
m
s
 
a
r
e
 
d
i
v
i
d
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
r
a
n
k
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
c
a
s
h
 
f
l
o
w
 
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
 
w
i
t
h
i
n
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f
a
m
i
l
y
 
g
r
o
u
p
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L
a
s
t
 
t
w
o
 
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
 
a
r
e
 
w
i
t
h
 
o
r
 
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
 
s
e
p
a
r
a
t
i
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o
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c
a
s
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f
l
o
w
 
r
i
g
h
t
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f
r
o
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c
o
n
t
r
o
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r
i
g
h
t
s
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.
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h
e
 
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
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r
e
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1
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O
w
n
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
o
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n
e
g
a
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i
v
e
 
s
h
o
c
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f
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i
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c
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i
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u
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c
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